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SCIENCE FOR JUDGES IX
Margaret A. Berger∗
The papers that follow are extended remarks of presentations
made at the ninth and final Science for Judges program held at
Brooklyn Law School on April 13 and 14, 2007. These twice
yearly conferences, generously funded by the Common Benefit
Trust established in the Silicone Breast Implant Products Liability
Litigation, began in March 2001. Their objective was to assist
judges in their difficult task of evaluating the admissibility of highly
complex and specialized expert testimony. Despite supplying most
of the monetary resources that made these programs possible, the
Trust was scrupulous in playing no role with regard to the
programs’ contents, or in the selection of speakers.
The programs were held under the auspices of Brooklyn Law
School’s Center for Health, Science and Public Policy in
collaboration with the Federal Judicial Center, the National Center
for State Courts, and the Committee on Science, Technology and
Law of the National Academies of Science. Judges from every
federal circuit and more than 36 states participated in these
conferences.
Many of the presentations at prior Science for Judges programs
focused on issues pertinent to proving causation in pharmaceutical
and environmental litigation. This emphasis was largely due to the
judicial community’s interest in the Daubert trilogy, a series of
three opinions by the United States Supreme Court on proving
causation.1 The first case, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Suzanne J. & Norman Miles Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 5226 U.S. 137 (1999); General Electric
v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993). See Margaret A. Berger, The Supreme Court’s Trilogy on the
Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
∗
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Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a toxic tort case, in which proof of causation
was crucial, was undoubtedly the chief impetus for the Science for
Judges programs. In its opinion, the Supreme Court obligated
federal trial judges to screen proffered expert opinions for scientific
validity. In order to exercise this “gatekeeper” function when
scientific testimony is proffered, judges need to understand
scientific methodology. Although Daubert applied only in federal
courts, it has been adopted by many states and has clearly had an
impact on the treatment of expert testimony in all jurisdictions. 2
The previous Science for Judges programs discussed a broad
range of topics that had a bearing on toxic tort cases. Some
presentations dealt specifically with the science used to prove
causation, such as epidemiology and toxicology; others programs
looked at particular litigations, such as those involving asbestos and
Agent Orange; and still others looked at a wide variety of
peripheral subjects that nevertheless affect science in a courtroom,
subjects as diverse as conflicts of interest in academia, preemption,
the handling of data, the role of the FDA and EPA, and evidencebased medicine. Other programs focused on the interaction of
science and law outside the toxic tort context; there were, for
instance, programs on forensic science, the impact of Daubert on
administrative agencies, and the admissibility of evidence that
relates to human behavior.3
EVIDENCE 9 (Federal Judicial Ctr. ed., 2d ed. 2000).
2
See David E. Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Daubert Trilogy in the
States, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 351 (2004).
3
Papers from previous Science for Judges programs can be found at 12 J.L.
& POL ’ Y 1, 1–53 (2003) (papers discussing the practice of epidemiology and
the science produced by administrative agencies); 12 J.L. & POL ’ Y 485, 485,
485–639 (2004) (papers discussing toxicology and epidemiology); 13 J.L. &
POL ’ Y 1, 1–179 (2005) (papers discussing the integrity of scientific research and
forensic evidence in criminal proceedings); 13 J.L. & POL’ Y 499, 499–647
(2005) (papers discussing Agent Orange and human behavior research); and 14
J.L. & POL ’ Y 1, 1–209 (2006) (papers discussing risk assessment dealing with
expert proof of causation in toxic tort cases and issues relevant to the availability
of data); 14 J.L. & POL ’ Y 525, 525–616 (2006) (papers discussing evidencebased medicine); 15 J.L. & POL ’ Y 1, 1–164 (2007) (papers discussing the
evidence of causation as well as current issues and standards of forensic
laboratories); 15 J.L. & POL ’ Y 983, 983–1223 (papers discussing the regulation
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Because the April 2007 program would be the last, we sought
to design a program that would provide a fitting close. We had twooverarching goals. First, we wished to touch base once again with
issues about Daubert and causation. Second, we wanted to use a
format that would allow participants to engage more actively with
the types of materials that judges must evaluate when science
enters the courtroom.
The first topic discussed at Science for Judges IX was juries.
Questions about jury competence to decide complex scientific
issues lurk in the background of Daubert. When Daubert hearings
result in the exclusion of plaintiff’s experts, a court often grants
summary judgment; this of course means that no jury will hear the
case or render a verdict. In such cases, the result is identical to that
which could be reached through a complexity exception to the
Seventh Amendment, a path that to date the Supreme Court has
not endorsed.4 Daubert has therefore operated to deflect direct
attacks on the meaning of the Seventh Amendment.
Juries are of interest not only because of the effect issues of
jury competency may have on Daubert jurisprudence. Not
infrequently, judges must rule on whether an expert may testify to
opinions based on social science research. The reliability
requirement of Daubert was extended to all experts by the Kumho
case so that judges must know how to evaluate studies such as
those currently being done on how juries function.
The Science for Judges program was extremely fortunate that
Professors Valerie P. Hans and Shari Seidman Diamond, two of the
most distinguished scholars in the field of jury research, spoke at
the program held at Brooklyn Law School and in addition
submitted articles that appear below.
Professor Hans’ designed an ingenious experiment that sought
to achieve a number of objectives: to compare the abilities of judges
versus jurors, to explain something to judges about study design,
and to engage judges in an interactive learning exercise about a
of pharmaceuticals and the scientific issues regarding asbestos litigation). All
papers are available in electronic form at http://brooklaw.edu/centers/sciencefor
judges/papers.php.
4
But see Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (in
patent infringement actions construction claims to be decided by court not jury).
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complex scientific subject, mitochondrial DNA. Her article, Judges,
Juries, and Scientific Evidence,5 describes how this was done and
furnishes a number of important insights on how juries function vis
a vis judges. She repeated with the participants at the program an
experiment that had originally been done through a jury study at a
mock trial. I do not want to give further details about what she and
the judges at the program achieved together because she tried a
unique approach that can best be experienced through her words
rather than mine. In addition, her article furnishes an excellent
introduction to the literature on jury competence in complex cases.
Professor Shari Seidman Diamond’s article reports conclusions
that have been reached in empirical studies of juries.6 She also
reports on findings that have emerged from a multi-faceted study of
juries in the state of Arizona where she has been given permission
to observe actual jury deliberations. She examines a number of
techniques that Arizona adopted that were aimed at facilitating jury
performance. Some of these, which Professor Diamond discusses,
were specifically designed to enable jurors to deal more effectively
with expert testimony. Her findings indicate that a number of
simple measures could improve jury comprehension.
Professor Diamond’s discussion also touches on an important
circumstance that is often ignored in comparisons of the abilities of
judges and jurors. Although some jurors may lack the education
required to understand scientific testimony, other jurors may have
relevant skills that surpass that of the judge.7 Both Professors
Diamond and Hans note that jurors can learn from each other, and
that accordingly a jury is potentially as competent as its most
highly qualified member. Looking at the lowest common
denominator does a disservice to how jurors function. Taken
together, the two articles offer a thoughtful rebuttal to critics of the
jury system who are convinced that lay jurors are incapable of
discharging their constitutional obligations.
The final two articles published in connection with Science for
5

16 J.L. & POL ’ Y 19 (2007).
Shari Seidman Diamond, How Jurors Deal with Expert Testimony and
How Judges Can Help, 16 J.L. & POL ’ Y 47 (2007).
7
Id. at 63–64.
6
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Judges IX return to the problems that are encountered when trying
to show that adverse health effects are the result of an exposure to
toxic substances. Dr. John Howard, the Director of the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, and the Coordinator
of the World Trade Center Health Programs, United States
Department of Health and Human Services, sets out in detail the
contours of a problem that may occupy the legal system for years
to come. His article, The World Trade Center Disaster: Health
Effects and Compensation Mechanisms,8 examines the many
different exposures to toxic materials that occurred as a
consequence of the terrible events of September 11, 2001. He also
considers the difficulties in determining who was exposed and the
effect of the exposures on a variety of subpopulations, consisting
of responders who came to assist, transients who were in the
vicinity on the day of the attack, and residents and school children
who were in the neighborhood of Ground Zero on and after
September 11. Dr. Howard also discusses the various
compensation schemes that came into play and the tort actions that
were instituted by some of those exposed, and he analyzes the
complex causation and compensation issues that are likely to arise
and will have to be explored in the years to come. By furnishing
this detailed account, Dr. Howard has provided a foundation for
further study of the medical, legal and political ramifications of
September 11. His report should be of enormous interest not only
to those who are actively involved in grappling with the enormous
problems and uncertainties that exist more than seven years after
the attack, but also to those who are seeking to find lessons to
apply if some future disaster ensues.
Professor Richard Scheines’ article, Causation, Statistics and
the Law,9 presents a remarkably clear account of the nature of
causal claims. Professor Scheines’ discussion contains numerous
examples and illustrations that make a highly complex subject
based on statistical reasoning much more comprehensible. While
Dr. Howard’s article describes a fact pattern that is unfortunately
not hypothetical, the Scheines article explains how the issue of
8
9

16 J.L. & POL ’ Y 69 (2007).
16 J.L. & POL ’ Y 135 (2007).
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causation should be approached by employing numerous
hypotheticals that make clear just how difficult it will be to resolve
some of the questions Dr. Howard raises. Professor Scheines bases
some of his discussion on a hypothetical that was distributed to
participants at the live program as part of the effort to encourage a
more interactive approach. The hypothetical, to which Professor
Scheines makes a number of references, is reprinted in its entirety
at the end of these articles.
As this is my last opportunity to do so, I want to express my
gratitude to the Advisory Board that assisted in the planning of
these programs and whose members spoke at some of the sessions.
Many thanks to the Hon. Shirley Abrahamson, Chief Justice,
Wisconsin; Dr. Joe Cecil, Project Director, Program on Scientific
and Technical Evidence, Division of Research, Federal Judicial
Center; Professor Joel E. Cohen, Abby Rockefeller Mauzé
Professor and Head of the Laboratory of Populations, The
Rockefeller University and Columbia University; Professor
Richard A. Merrill, formerly Daniel Caplin Professor of Law,
University of Virginia Law School; Professor Judith Resnik, Arthur
Liman Professor, Yale Law School; and the Hon. Jack B.
Weinstein, United States Senior District Judge, Eastern District of
New York. I also want to thank the many persons at Brooklyn
Law School who helped to make these programs possible, and
especially the Dean of Brooklyn Law School, Joan G. Wexler, and
Professor Karen Porter, the Executive Director of Brooklyn Law
School’s Center for Health, Science and Public Policy, who handled
many of the administrative chores required in organizing these
programs.

